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This paper presents a dynamic political economy theory of public spending, taxation, and 
debt. The theory builds on the well-known tax smoothing approach to fiscal policy pioneered by 
Robert Barro (1979). This approach predicts that governments will use budget surpluses and def-
icits as a buffer to prevent tax rates from changing too sharply. Thus, governments will run defi-
cits in times of high government spending needs and surpluses when needs are low. Underlying 
the approach are the assumptions that governments are benevolent, that government spending 
needs fluctuate over time, and that the deadweight costs of income taxes are a convex function 
of the tax rate. The economic environment underlying our theory is similar to that in the tax 
smoothing literature. Our key departure is that policy decisions are made by a legislature rather 
than a benevolent planner. Moreover, we introduce the friction that legislators can distribute 
revenues back to their districts via pork-barrel spending.
More specifically, our theory assumes that policy choices are made by a legislature comprised 
of representatives elected by single-member, geographically defined districts. The legislature 
can raise revenues in two ways: via a proportional tax on labor income and by borrowing in the 
capital market. Borrowing takes the form of issuing risk-free one-period bonds. The legislature 
can also purchase bonds and use the interest earnings to help finance future public spending if 
it so chooses. Public revenues are used to finance the provision of a public good that benefits all 
citizens and to provide targeted district-specific transfers, which are interpreted as pork-barrel 
spending. The value of the public good to citizens is stochastic, reflecting shocks such as wars or 
natural disasters. The legislature makes policy decisions by majority (or super-majority) rule and 
legislative policymaking in each period is modelled using the legislative bargaining approach of 
David Baron and John Ferejohn (1989). The level of public debt acts as a state variable, creating 
a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods.
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Incorporating political decision making in this way resolves an important theoretical diffi-
culty with the tax smoothing approach first pointed out by S. Rao Aiyagari et al. (2002). While 
Barro’s original analysis assumes that the government perfectly anticipates its fluctuating spend-
ing needs, Aiyagari et al. tackle the more relevant case of uncertainty. They demonstrate that 
the tax smoothing logic does not necessarily imply the countercyclical theory of deficits and 
surpluses that it had been presumed to. In some environments, the optimal policy is for the 
government to gradually acquire sufficient bond holdings so as eventually to be able to finance 
any level of spending with the interest earnings from these holdings. This permits the financing 
of government spending without distortionary taxation. Interest earnings in excess of spending 
needs are rebated to citizens via lump sum transfers. Obviously, the prediction of a steady state 
with huge government asset accumulation and zero taxes is unsatisfactory. This prediction is 
avoided if exogenous limits on the amount of debt that the government can hold are imposed, but 
Aiyagari et al. rightly criticize these as “ad hoc.”
1
Intuitively, it seems likely that legislators entrusted with a large stock of government assets 
would run it down and distribute the proceeds back to their districts, and this is precisely the 
force that our theory captures. Thus, despite the fact that there are no ad hoc debt limits, the 
long-run level of government bond holdings in political equilibrium is below the efficient level. 
Moreover, equilibrium policies display the dynamic pattern suggested by Barro; namely, debt 
goes up when the value of public goods is high and down when it is low. In addition, debt serves 
to smooth taxes.
Our theory offers a number of other advantages over the basic tax smoothing approach. First, 
it allows for the possibility that the government can be in perpetual debt. Second, it provides pre-
dictions concerning the dynamics of legislative policymaking and on the mix of public spending 
between pork and public goods. Third, it provides a sharp account of how political decision mak-
ing “distorts” public policies. Fourth, the theory permits a welfare analysis of fiscal restraints 
such as balanced budget rules.
That pork-barrel spending gives rise to inefficiencies in legislative decision making is a core 
idea of political economy. Moreover, it is now well understood that in dynamic environments, 
redistributive considerations can lead legislatures to be present-biased. What is novel about our 
paper is that we incorporate these ideas into a dynamic general equilibrium model that contains 
the key assumptions of the tax smoothing literature. This allows us to better integrate the politi-
cal economy and tax smoothing literatures. In particular, we can study how the political forces 
favoring present bias in legislative policymaking interact with the economic forces favoring the 
use of debt for tax smoothing purposes. The interplay between these forces gives rise to what is, 
in our judgement, a richer and more satisfying theory of fiscal policy.
Our basic approach to incorporating legislative decision making into a dynamic general equi-
librium model follows our earlier work in Battaglini and Coate (2007). In that paper, we explored 
how pork-barrel spending affects the overall size of government and distorts investment in public 
capital goods. We analyzed an environment in which, in each period, the legislature can raise 
revenues via a distortionary income tax and these revenues can be used to finance investment in a 
public good and in pork-barrel spending. The environment we study in this paper differs in three 
key ways. First, the government can borrow as well as levy income taxes. Second, the public 
good is not an investment good. Third, the value of the public good is stochastic. This makes for 
a very different application, with the key dynamic linkage across periods created by the level of 
debt rather than the stock of public good.
1 Yongseok Shin (2006) shows that this prediction can be avoided if citizens face idiosyncratic and uninsurable 
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The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present 
the model. Section II provides a benchmark by describing the planning solution for the economy. 
Section III characterizes the political equilibrium and develops the positive predictions of the 
theory. Section IV explains precisely how political decision making distorts the efficient solu-
tion. Section V discusses the empirical implications of the theory, and Section VI applies the 
theory to analyze the desirability of a balanced budget requirement. Section VII discusses the 
related political economy literature and Section VIII offers a brief conclusion. The Appendix 
contains the proofs of the propositions.
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I.  The Model
A. The Economic Environment
A continuum of infinitely lived citizens live in n identical districts indexed by i 5 1,  …  , n. The 
size of the population in each district is normalized to one. There is a single (nonstorable) con-
sumption good, denoted by z, that is produced using a single factor, labor, denoted by l, with the 
linear technology z 5 wl. There is also a public good, denoted by g, that can be produced from 
the consumption good according to the linear technology g 5 z/p.
Citizens consume the consumption good, benefit from the public good, and supply labor. Each 
citizen’s per period utility function is






where a [ 10, 12 and e . 0. The parameter A measures the value of the public good to the citi-
zens. Citizens discount future per period utilities at rate d.
The value of the public good varies across periods in a random way, reflecting shocks to the 
society such as wars and natural disasters. Specifically, in each period, A is the realization of a 
random variable with range 3A –, A ¯] (where 0 , A – , A ¯) and cumulative distribution function g1A2. 
The function g is continuously differentiable and its associated density is bounded uniformly 
below by some positive constant j . 0, so that for any pair of realizations such that A , A9, the 
difference g1A92 2 g1A2 is at least as big as j1A9 2 A2. Thus, g assigns positive probability to 
all nondegenerate subintervals of 3A –, A ¯].
There is a competitive labor market and competitive production of the public good. Thus, the 
wage rate is equal to w and the price of the public good is p. There is also a market in risk-free 
one-period bonds. The assumption of a constant marginal utility of consumption implies that the 
equilibrium interest rate on these bonds must be r 5 1/d 2 1. At this interest rate, citizens will 
be indifferent as to their allocation of consumption across time.
B. government Policies
The public good is provided by the government. The government can raise revenue by levying 
a proportional tax on labor income. It can also borrow and lend in the bond market by selling 
and buying risk-free one-period bonds.
3 Revenues can not only be used to finance the provision 
2  More  detailed  proofs  can  be  found  in  the  Web  Appendix  (available  at  http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.
php?doi=10.1257/aer.98.1.201).
3 Thus we do not consider state-contingent debt as in Robert Lucas and Nancy Stokey (1983). We believe that this 
is the appropriate assumption for a positive analysis. We also do not consider debt with different maturity structures. MARch 2008 204 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
of the public good, but can also be diverted to finance targeted district-specific transfers, which 
are interpreted as (nondistortionary) pork-barrel spending.
Government policy in any period is described by an n 1 3-tuple 5r, g, x, s1,  …  , sn6, where r is 
the income tax rate; g is the amount of the public good provided; x is the amount of bonds sold; 
and si is the proposed transfer to district i’s residents. When x is negative, the government is buy-
ing bonds. In each period, the government must also repay any bonds that it sold in the previous 
period. Thus, if it sold b bonds in the previous period, it must repay 11 1 r2b in the current period. 
The government’s initial debt level in period 1 is given exogenously and is denoted by b0.
In a period in which government policy is 5r, g, x, s1,  …  , sn6, each citizen will supply an amount 
of labor
(2)    l
*1w11 2 r22 5 arg max
l





It is straightforward to show that l
*1w11 2 r22 5 1ew11 2 r22
e, so that e is the elasticity of labor 
supply. A citizen in district i who simply consumes his net of tax earnings and his transfer will 
obtain a per period utility of u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 si , where






Since citizens are indifferent as to their allocation of consumption across time, their lifetime 
expected utility will equal the value of their initial bond holdings plus the payoff they would 
obtain if they simply consumed their net earnings and transfers in each period.
Government policies must satisfy three feasibility constraints. The first is that revenues must 
be sufficient to cover expenditures. To see what this implies, consider a period in which the initial 
level of government debt is b and the policy choice is 5r, g, x, s1,  …  , sn6. Expenditure on public 
goods and debt repayment is pg 1 11 1 r2b; tax revenue is
(4)    R1r2 5 nrwl
*1w11 2 r22 5 nrw1ew11 2 r22
e;
and revenue from bond sales is x. Letting the net of transfer surplus (i.e., the difference between 
revenues and spending on public goods and debt repayment) be denoted by
(5)    B1r, g, x; b2 5 R1r2 2 pg 1 x 2 11 1 r2b,
the constraint requires that B1r, g, x; b2 $ gi si.
The second constraint is that the district-specific transfers must be nonnegative (i.e., si $ 0 
for all i). This rules out financing public spending via district-specific lump sum taxes. With 
lump sum taxes, there would be no need to impose the distortionary labor tax and hence no tax 
smoothing problem.
The third and final constraint is that the amount of government borrowing must be feasible. 
In particular, there is an upper limit x ¯ on the amount of bonds the government can sell. This is 
motivated by the unwillingness of borrowers to hold bonds that they know will not be repaid. 
If the government were borrowing an amount x such that the interest payments exceeded the 
While George-Marios Angeletos (2002) has argued that maturity structures can substitute for state-contingent debt, his 
argument does not apply in our model because the interest rate is constant.VOL. 98 NO. 1 205 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
  maximum possible tax revenues, i.e., rx . maxr R1r2, then it would be unable to repay the debt 
even if it provided no public goods or transfers. Thus, the maximum level of debt is certainly less 
than this level, implying that x ¯ # maxr R1r2/r. In fact, we will assume that x ¯ is slightly smaller 
than maxr R1r2/r. This is because if x ¯ equals maxr R1r2/r, then if government debt ever reached x ¯ 
it would stay there forever, because the legislature could never pay it off. For our dynamic results, 
it is convenient to assume away this (relatively uninteresting) possibility.
We avoid assuming that there is any ad hoc limit on the amount of bonds that the government 
can purchase (see Aiyagari et al. 2002). In particular, the government is allowed to hold sufficient 
bonds to permit it to always finance the Samuelson level of the public good from the interest 
earnings. This level of bonds is given by x _ 5 2pgS1A ¯2/r, where gS1A2 is the level of the public 
good that satisfies the Samuelson Rule when the value of the public good is A.
4 Since the govern-
ment will never want to hold more bonds than this, there is no loss of generality in constraining 
the choice of debt to the interval 3x _, x ¯4, and we will do this below.
5 We also assume that the initial 
level of government debt, b0, belongs to the interval 3x _, x ¯4.
C. The Political Process
Government policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from each 
of the n districts. One citizen from each district is selected to be that district’s representative. 
Since all citizens have the same policy preferences, the identity of the representative is imma-
terial and hence the selection process can be ignored.
6 The legislature meets at the beginning 
of each period. These meetings take only an insignificant amount of time, and representatives 
undertake private sector work in the rest of the period just like everybody else. The affirmative 
votes of q , n representatives are required to enact any legislation.
To describe how legislative decision making works, suppose the legislature is meeting at the 
beginning of a period in which the current level of public debt is b and the value of the public 
good is A. One of the legislators is randomly selected to make the first proposal, with each rep-
resentative having an equal chance of being recognized. A proposal is a policy 5r, g, x, s1,  …  , sn6 
that satisfies the feasibility constraints. If the first proposal is accepted by q legislators, then it 
is implemented and the legislature adjourns until the beginning of the next period. At that time, 
the legislature meets again, with the difference being that the initial level of public debt is x and 
there is a new realization of the value of public goods. If, on the other hand, the first proposal 
is not accepted, another legislator is chosen to make a proposal. There are T $ 2 such proposal 
rounds, each of which takes a negligible amount of time. If the process continues until proposal 
round T, and the proposal made at that stage is rejected, then a legislator is appointed to choose 
a default policy. The only restrictions on the choice of a default policy are that it be feasible and 
that it involve a uniform district-specific transfer (i.e., si 5 sj for all i, j).
4 The Samuelson Rule is that the sum of marginal benefits equals the marginal cost, which means that gS1A2 satisfies 
the first-order condition that naAg
a21 5 p.
5 By assuming that the government can choose to borrow any amount in the interval [x _, x ¯], we are implicitly assum-
ing that the wage is sufficiently high that the amount spent on public goods is never higher than national income. To 
see this, imagine that the initial level of government debt is b and the government chooses the policy 5r, g, x, s1,  …  , sn6. 
Then, feasibility demands that the amount borrowed, x, must be less than the total amount of private sector income. 
The latter is given by gi si 1 11 1 r2b 1 n11 2 r2w1ew11 2 r22
e. Assuming government budget balance, we know that 
gi si 1 11 1 r2b is equal to x 1 R1r2 2 pg. Substituting this in, the feasibility condition amounts to the requirement 
that nw1ew11 2 r22
e (which is national income) exceed pg. In either the equilibrium or the planner’s solution, national 
income always exceeds nw5ew3e/11 1 e246
e and public good spending is always less than pgS1A ¯2. Thus, a sufficient 
condition is that nw5ew3e/11 1 e246
e . pgS1A ¯2. Of course, such a condition would not be required in the case of a small 
open economy which could borrow from abroad.
6 While citizens may differ in their bond holdings, this has no impact on their policy preferences.MARch 2008 206 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
II.  The Social Planner’s Solution
To establish a normative benchmark with which to compare the political equilibrium, we 
begin by describing the policies that would be chosen by a social planner whose objective was to 
maximize aggregate utility. This is basically the problem considered by Aiyagari et al. (2002). 
However, we will derive the solution in a way that sets the stage for the more complicated analy-
sis of the political equilibrium.
7
The planner’s problem can be formulated recursively. The state of the economy is summarized 
by the current level of public debt b and the value of the public good A. Let v1b, A2 denote maxi-
mal average citizen expected utility (net of the value of initial bond holdings) at the beginning of 
a period in which the state is 1b, A2.
8 Then, in a period in which the state is 1b, A2, the planner’s 
problem is to choose a policy 5r, g, x, s1,  …  , sn6 to solve
(6)    maxu1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
gi si
n
 1 dEv1x, A92 
  s.t. gisi # B1r, g, x; b2, 
  si $ 0 for all i, and x [ 3x _, x ¯4.
The three constraints are the feasibility constraints described in Section IB.
This problem can be simplified by observing that if the net of transfer surplus B1r, g, x; b2 
were positive, the planner would use it to finance transfers, and hence gisi 5 B1r, g, x; b2. Thus, 
we can eliminate the choice variables 1s1,  …  , sn2 and reformulate the problem as choosing a tax 
rate–public good–public debt triple 1r, g, x2 to solve
(7)    max u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92 
  s.t. B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4.
The problem in this form is fairly standard. The planner’s value function must satisfy the func-
tional equation
(8)  v1b, A2 5 max
1r, g, x2
5u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92 : B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯46.
Familiar arguments can be applied to show that such a value function exists and that Ev1 · , A2 
is differentiable and strictly concave. From this, the properties of the optimal policies may be 
deduced.
7 Aiyagari et al. allow for more general preferences, focusing on the quasi-linear case as a leading example. This 
complicates the model because interest rates are affected by government policy. These complications require them to 
use a less transparent solution method.
8 Maximal average expected utility will be b11 1 r2/n 1 v1b, A2.VOL. 98 NO. 1 207 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
A. The Optimal Policies
Using equations (3) and (4) and letting l denote the multiplier on the budget constraint, we can 
write the first-order conditions for the maximization problem in (8) as follows:
(9)    1 1 l 5 
1 2 r
1 2 r11 1 e2
 ,
(10)    naAg
a21 5 c
1 2 r
1 2 r11 1 e2
d p,
and
(11)   
1 2 r




d (5 if x , x ¯).
To interpret these, note that 11 2 r2/11 2 r11 1 e22 measures the marginal cost of taxation—the 
social cost of raising an additional unit of revenue via a tax increase. It exceeds unity whenever 
the tax rate (r) is positive, because taxation is distortionary. For a given tax rate, the marginal 
cost of taxation is higher the more elastic is labor supply; that is, the higher is e. Condition (9) 
therefore says that the benefit of raising an additional unit of revenue—which is measured by 1 1 
l—must equal the marginal cost of taxation. Condition (10) says that the marginal social benefit 
of the public good must equal its price times the marginal cost of taxation. This is basically the 
Samuelson Rule modified to take into account the fact that taxation is distortionary. Condition 
(11) says that the benefit of increasing debt in terms of reducing taxes must equal the marginal 
cost of an increase in the debt level. This cost is that there is a higher initial level of debt next 
period. The condition can hold as an inequality, if the debt level is at its ceiling.
In any particular state 1b, A2, there are two possibilities. The first is that the planner is making 
transfers to the citizens, in which case l 5 0. In this case, conditions (9) and (10) imply that the 
tax rate r must be zero and the level of the public good g must equal the Samuelson level gS1A2. 
Intuitively, if r were positive, the planner would find it strictly optimal to reduce transfers and the 
tax rate simultaneously: this would reduce the deadweight loss of taxation and increase citizen 
welfare. Similarly, if the public good level were less than the Samuelson level, the planner could 
reduce transfers and increase public good provision. The debt level in this case, which we denote 
by x
o, must satisfy the requirement that the expected marginal cost of borrowing equals one. We 
will investigate what this implies below.
The second possibility is that the planner is making no transfers. In this case, the optimal tax 
rate–public good–public debt triple is implicitly defined by equations (10), (11), and the require-
ment that the net of transfer surplus is zero; i.e.,
(12)    B1r, g, x; b2 5 0.
A positive value of l implies that the tax rate r must exceed zero and the level of the public good 
g is less than the Samuelson level gS1A2. Moreover, the level of debt exceeds x
o. The tax rate and 
debt level are increasing in b and A, while the public good level is decreasing in b and increasing 
in A.
9 Intuitively, an increase in b makes the budget harder to satisfy, forcing the planner to raise 
9 These facts are established in the Web Appendix.MARch 2008 208 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
more revenues and scrimp on the public good. An increase in A makes the public good more 
valuable and leads the planner to raise taxes and debt to finance more public spending.
In which states will the two possibilities arise? Let A
o1b, x
o2 be the largest value of A consistent 
with the triple 10, gS1A2, x
o2 satisfying the constraint that B10, gS1A2, x
o; b2 $ 0.
10 Then, if the state 
1b, A2 is such that A , A
o1b, x




B. The debt Level x
o
The next step is to characterize the debt level, x
o, the planner chooses when he makes trans-
fers. Intuitively, if the planner is willing to rebate scarce revenues back to citizens, then he must 
expect not to be imposing taxes in the next period; otherwise, he would be better off reducing 
transfers and acquiring more bonds. This suggests that the debt level x
o must be such that future 
taxes are equal to zero, implying that x
o equals x _. This is indeed the case but it is instructive to 
derive it formally.
Recall that x
o is such that the expected marginal cost of borrowing equals one. Given the dis-
cussion above, we can write the value function as
B1r, g, z; x2
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1                    1 dEv1z, A92
  n
  max5r, g, z6  µ      ∂  if A $ A
o1x, x
o2
(13)   v1x, A2 5  µ  B1r, g, z; x2 $ 0 and z [ 3x _, x ¯4  .
B(0, gS1A2, x
o; x2
  u1w, gS1A2; A2 1                            1 dEv1x
































o2 5 0. Taking expectations, we have that the expected marginal social cost of debt is














o1x, A211 1 e2
b dg1A2.
10 If B10, 0, x
o; b2 , 0, let A
o1b, x
o2 5 0.VOL. 98 NO. 1 209 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
Thus, the debt level x
o must satisfy the following equation:















o, A211 1 e2
b dg1A2.
This implies that A
o1x
o, x
o2 5 A ¯, which in turn means that x
o 5 x _.
C. dynamics
The optimal policies determine a distribution of public debt levels in each period. In the long 
run, this sequence of debt distributions converges to the distribution that puts point mass on the 
debt level x _. To understand this, first note that since A
o1x _, x _2 5 A ¯, it is clear that once the planner 
has accumulated a level of bonds equal to 2x _, he will maintain it. On the other hand, when the 
planner has bond holdings less than 2x _, he must anticipate using distortionary taxation in the 
future. To smooth taxes, he has an incentive to acquire additional bonds when the value of the 
public good is low in the current period. This leads to an upward drift in government bond hold-
ings over time.
Pulling all this together, we have the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: The social planner’s solution converges to a steady state in which the debt 
level is x _, the tax rate is 0, the public good level is gS1A2, and citizens receive r12x _2 2 pgS1A2 in 
transfers.
This result illustrates, in the context of our model, the problem with the tax smoothing ap- 
proach identified by Aiyagari et al. Though the planner cannot issue state contingent bonds, he 
can smooth taxation across states by accumulating assets. As shown in Aiyagari et al. by numeri-
cal methods, this phenomenon is general and can characterize the planner’s solution under less 
restrictive assumptions on the functional forms of the citizens’ utilities and the stochastic process 
of government spending.
One way to avoid the absorbing state in which x 5 x _ is to assume that the social planner faces 
what Aiyagari et al. call ad hoc constraints on asset accumulation. If the planner is not allowed 
to accumulate more bonds than, say, 2z where z [ 1x _, 02, then even in the long run the optimal 
debt level will fluctuate and taxes will be positive at least some of the time.
11 This is because, 
by definition of x _, even when the planner has accumulated 2z in bonds he cannot finance the 
Samuelson level of public goods from the interest earnings when A is very high. In these high 
realizations, it will be optimal to finance additional public good provision by a combination of 
levying taxes and reducing bond holdings. Reducing bond holdings temporarily allows the plan-
ner to smooth taxes. The dynamic pattern of debt suggested by Barro is created by the rebuilding 
of bond holdings in future periods when A is low. However, the difficulty with this resolution 
of the problem is obvious: why should the planner be so constrained, and, if he is, what should 
determine the level z ?
III.  Political Equilibrium
We look for a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in which any representative selected to 
propose at round t [ 51,  …  , T6 of the meeting at some time t makes the same proposal and this 
11 In order for taxes to always be positive it must be the case that r12z2 , pgS1A –2.MARch 2008 210 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
depends only on the current level of public debt (b) and the value of the public good 1A2.
12 As stan-
dard in the theory of legislative voting, we assume that legislators vote for a proposal if they prefer 
it (weakly) to continuing on to the next proposal round.
13 We focus, without loss of generality, on 
equilibria in which at each round t, proposals are immediately accepted by at least q legislators, 
so that on the equilibrium path, no meeting lasts more than one proposal round. Accordingly, the 
policies that are actually implemented in equilibrium are those proposed in the first round.
Let 5r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A26 denote the tax rate, public good, and public debt policies that are 
implemented in equilibrium, and let B1b, A2 be the total amount of revenues devoted to transfers 
(i.e., B1b, A2 5 B1r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A2; b22. In addition, let v1b, A2 denote the legislators’ com-
mon (net of initial bond holdings) value function. Reflecting the fact that legislators are ex ante 
equally likely to receive transfers, this is defined recursively by
(17)    v1b, A2 5 u1w11 2 r1b, A22, g1b, A2; b2 1 
B1b, A2
n
 1 dEv1x1b, A2, A92.
This is also the (net of initial bond holdings) value function for each citizen, since, as noted ear-
lier, representatives have the same policy preferences as their constituents.
14
We restrict attention to a particular type of equilibrium, which we refer to as a “well-behaved 
equilibrium.” To define what this is, call the interval of debt levels 3inf 1b, A2x1b, A2, x ¯4 the pol-
icy domain. Levels of debt outside this range will never be observed except when exogenously 
assumed at date zero. An equilibrium is said to be well behaved if the associated legislators’ 
value function satisfies the following three properties: (a) v is continuous on the state space; (b) 
for all A, v1 · , A2 is concave on 3x _, x ¯4 and Ev1 · , A2 is strictly concave on the policy domain; and (c) 
for all b, v1 · , A2 is differentiable at b for almost all A. In the Appendix, we demonstrate:
PROPOSITION 2: There exists a unique well-behaved equilibrium.
This is the equilibrium that we characterize in what follows.
A. The Equilibrium Policies
The basic structure of the equilibrium policies is easily understood. To get support for his pro-
posal, the proposer must obtain the votes of q 2 1 other representatives. Accordingly, given that 
12 A Markov perfect equilibrium is a particular type of subgame perfect equilibrium in which strategies do not 
depend on payoff-irrelevant past events. By focusing on Markov perfect equilibria, we rule out, for example, equilibria 
in which proposers punish earlier proposers for not providing their districts with transfers. Markov games (such as the 
game studied here) generally have a large set of subgame perfect equilibria and the Markov perfect requirement allows 
us to dramatically shrink this set. Non–Markov equilibria are often supported by complex strategies, or by strategies 
that (even when they are simple) require unrealistic degrees of coordination from the players. Markov equilibria do not 
require coordination and are very simple. The idea of simplicity has been formalized by Baron and Ehud Kalai (1993) 
for the static Baron and Ferejohn game. Given a standard definition of simplicity (Kalai and William Stanford 1988), 
they have shown that the unique, simplest equilibrium of this game is stationary (i.e., Markov). Stationarity is also sup-
ported in a recent laboratory experiment. Guillaume Frechette, John Kagel, and Massimo Morelli (2005) have shown 
that there is no evidence of nonstationary behavior in the data of their experimental study of the Baron and Ferejohn 
game.
13 As in all voting games, it is possible to construct equilibria in which legislators vote against a proposal even if 
they strictly prefer it to continuing on to the next proposal round. If all voters always vote no to a proposal and there are 
three or more voters, then no voter will be pivotal and voting no will be weakly optimal no matter what preferences are. 
These equilibria are implausible and uninteresting. This assumption on legislators’ voting behavior rules them out.
14 The expected lifetime payoff of a citizen with bond holdings y at the beginning of a period in which the state is 
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utility is transferable, he is effectively making decisions to maximize the utility of q legislators.
15 
It is therefore as if a randomly chosen coalition of q representatives is selected in each period, 
and this coalition chooses a policy choice to maximize its aggregate utility.
The proposer’s policy will depend upon the state 1b, A2. As in the social planner’s solution, 
there are two possibilities: either the proposer will propose transfers for his coalition or he will 
not. Because the proposer is taking into account only the welfare of q legislators, and transfers 
are financed collectively, his incentive to choose transfers is obviously greater than the planner’s. 
Nonetheless, transfers require reducing public good spending or increasing taxation in the pres-
ent or the future (if financed by issuing additional debt). When b and/or A are sufficiently high, 
the marginal benefit of spending on the public good and the marginal cost of increasing taxation 
may be too high to make this attractive. In this case, the proposer will not propose transfers and 
the outcome will be as if the proposer is maximizing the utility of the legislature as a whole.
In equilibrium, therefore, there will exist a cut-off value of the public good, inversely related 
to the level of public debt, that divides the state space into two ranges. Above the cut-off, the 
proposer will propose a no-transfer policy package that maximizes aggregate legislator utility. 
This proposal will be supported by the entire legislature. Below the cut-off, the proposer chooses 
a policy package that provides pork for his own district and those of a minimum winning coali-
tion of representatives. The transfer paid out to coalition members will be just sufficient to make 
them favor accepting the proposal. Thus, only those legislators whose districts receive pork vote 
for the proposal. We will refer to the first regime as responsible policymaking (RPM) and the 
second as business-as-usual (BAU).
To develop this more precisely, consider the problem of choosing the tax rate–public good–
public debt triple that maximizes the collective utility of q representatives under the assumption 
that they divide the net of transfer surplus among their districts and that the constraint that this 
surplus be nonnegative is nonbinding. Formally, the problem is
(18)    max 1r, g, x2u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
q
 1 dEv1x, A92
  s.t. x [ 3x _, x ¯4.
Using the first-order conditions for this problem, the solution is 1r
*, g
*1A2, x
*2, where the tax rate 
r
* satisfies the condition that












the public good level g
*1A2 satisfies the condition that






15 This is demonstrated formally in the Web Appendix.MARch 2008 212 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
and the public debt level x
* satisfies







d    (5 if x
* , x ¯).
Condition (19) says that the benefit of raising taxes in terms of increasing the per-legislator 
transfer (1/q) must equal the per-capita cost of the increase in the tax rate. Condition (20) says 
that the per-capita benefit of increasing the public good must equal the per-legislator reduction 
in transfers that providing the additional unit necessitates. Condition (21) tells us that the benefit 
of increasing debt in terms of increasing the per-legislator transfer must equal the per-capita cost 
of an increase in the debt level.
Now define A
*1b, x2 to be the largest value of A consistent with the triple 1r
*, g
*1A2, x2 satisfy-
ing the constraint that B1r
*, g
*1A2, x; b2 $ 0.
16 Then, if the state 1b, A2 is such that A , A
*1b, x
*2, 
the proposer proposes the triple 1r
*, g
*1A2, x
*2 together with a transfer just sufficient to induce 
members of the coalition to accept the proposal, and the legislature is in the BAU regime. If A 
$ A
*1b, x
*2, then the constraint that B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 must bind and the solution equals that which 
maximizes aggregate legislator utility. The legislature is therefore in the RPM regime. Thus, we 
have:
LEMMA 1: There exists some debt level x
* such that, if A $ A
*1b, x
*2,
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92
    1r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A22 5 arg  max µ                                                                          ∂
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4
and B1b, A2 5 0, while if A , A
*1b, x
*2,




and B1b, A2 . 0.
In the RPM regime (i.e., when A $ A
*1b, x
*2), just as in the social planner’s solution, the equi-
librium tax rate–public good–public debt triple is implicitly defined by conditions (10), (11), and 
(12) (obviously, with the equilibrium value function). Thus, as in the planner’s problem, the tax 
rate and debt level are increasing in b and A, while the public good level is decreasing in b and 
increasing in A.
Note  that  at  A  5  A
*1b, x




*2. To see this, note first that 1r
*, g
*1A2, x
*2 satisfies the budget balance condition (12) at 
A 5 A
*1b, x
*2. In addition, using the definition of r
* in (19), we may write the first-order conditions 
(20) and (21) in the same form as (10) and (11). Thus, the equilibrium policy proposal is a con-
tinuous function of the state 1b, A2. Moreover, given the monotonicity properties of the solution 
in the RPM regime, it follows that when A . A
*1b, x
*2, the equilibrium policy proposal involves 
16 If B1r
*, 0, x; b2 , 0, let A
*1b, x2 5 0.VOL. 98 NO. 1 213 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
a tax rate higher than r
*, the provision of a public good level below g
*1A2, and a level of debt that 
exceeds x
*. Thus, in the political equilibrium, the government’s debt level is always at least x
*, the 
tax rate is always at least r
*, and the public good level is always no greater than g
*1A2.
B. The debt Level x
*
The next step is to characterize the debt level x
* that the proposer chooses when providing pork 
to his coalition. We use a similar strategy to that used to characterize x
o in the planner’s problem. 
From Lemma 1 we know that, in equilibrium,
B1r, g, z; x2
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1                    1 dEv1z, A92
  n
  max5r, g, z6  µ      ∂  if A $ A
*1x, x
*2





  u1w11 2 r
*2, g
*1A2; A2 1                            1 dEv1x




Thus, by the Envelope Theorem:
  2a
1 2 r1x, A2














b  if A , A
*1x, x
*2
In contrast to the planner’s solution, there is a discontinuity in the derivative of the value func-
tion when A 5 A
*1x, x
*2. This reflects the fact that the tax rate r1x, A
*2 equals r
* and hence the 
marginal cost of taxation strictly exceeds 1. Intuitively, a higher future level of debt reduces pork 
if the legislature is in the BAU regime and increases taxes if the legislature is in the RPM regime. 
Increasing taxes is more costly than reducing pork because taxes are positive in RPM and thus 
the marginal cost of public funds exceeds one.
Using this expression to compute the expected marginal cost of borrowing and using our first-
order condition (21), we find that x
* must satisfy
















*, A211 1 e2
b dg1A2 (5 if x
* , x ¯).
Our assumption concerning the maximum debt level x ¯ implies that A
*1x ¯, x ¯2 , A –. Thus, since 
taxes exceed r
* in the RPM regime, condition (19) implies that the expected marginal social cost 
of debt must exceed n/q when x
* 5 x ¯. It follows that x
* is strictly less than x ¯, and condition (24) 
must hold as an equality.MARch 2008 214 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
Notice that for condition (24) to be satisfied, A
*1x
*, x
*2 must lie strictly between A – and A ¯. 
Intuitively, this means that the debt level x
* must be such that the legislature will transition out of 
BAU with positive probability and stay in it with positive probability. This has important impli-
cations for the magnitude of x
*, which we will draw out below.
C. dynamics
The equilibrium policies determine a distribution of public debt levels in each period. In the 
Appendix, we show that this sequence of debt distributions converges to a unique invariant 
distribution. Thus, no matter what the economy’s initial debt level, the same distribution of debt 
emerges in the long run. The lower bound of the support of this distribution is x
*—the level of 
public debt chosen in the BAU regime. There is a mass point at this debt level, since the prob-
ability of remaining at x
* once having reached it is g1A
*1x
*, x
*22—which is positive. However, 
the distribution of debt is nondegenerate because, as just noted, x
* must be such that there is a 
positive probability of leaving the BAU regime.
Combining this with our earlier discussion yields the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3: The equilibrium debt distribution converges to a unique invariant distribu-
tion whose support is a subset of [x
*, x ¯]. This distribution has a mass point at x
* but is nondegen-
erate. When the debt level is x
*, the tax rate is r
*, the public good level is g
*1A2, and a minimum 
winning coalition of districts receives transfers. When the debt level exceeds x
*, the tax rate 
exceeds r
*, the public good level is less than g
*1A2, and no districts receive transfers.
The dynamics of the equilibrium are such that, in the long run, legislative policymaking oscillates 
between BAU and RPM. Periods of BAU are brought to an end by high realizations of the value of 
public goods. These trigger an increase in debt and taxes to finance higher public good spending 
and a cessation of pork-barrel spending. Once in the RPM regime, further high realizations of the 
value of the public good trigger further increases in debt and higher taxes. Policymaking returns to 
BAU only after a suitable sequence of low realizations of the value of the public good. The larger 
the amount of debt that has been built up, the greater the expected time before returning to BAU.




and Ah be larger than A
*1x
*, x
*2. Suppose that the legislature is in BAU in period t 2 1 so that the 
level of debt is x
* at the beginning of period t. Further suppose that in periods t through tL the 
value of the public good is AL; in periods tL 1 1 through th the value of the public good is Ah; 
and in periods th 1 1 and beyond the value of the public good returns to AL. Then, the dynamic 
pattern of debt, tax rates, and public good provision is as represented in Figure 1. At date tL 1 1,   
debt, taxes, and public good levels jump in response to the increase in A. During periods tL 1 1   
through th, debt and taxes continue to rise, while public good provision falls. In period th 1 1, 
public good provision drops in response to the fall in A, overshooting its natural level g
*1AL2. 
After period th 1 1, debt and taxes start to fall and public good provision increases. Eventually, 
the legislature returns to BAU.
If the debt level x
* is positive, the economy is in perpetual debt, with the extent of debt spiking 
up after a sequence of high values of the public good. When x
* is negative, the government will 
have positive asset holdings at least some of the time. A key question is therefore what deter-
mines the magnitude of x
*. As noted earlier, x
* must be such that the legislature will transition 
out of BAU with positive probability and stay in it with positive probability. We now use this 
observation to shed light on the determinants of x
*.
Given the definition of the function A
*, the critical value A
*1x
*, x




*1A2. Thus, since A
*1x
*, x
*2 must lie between A – and A ¯, if R1r
*2 exceeds pg
*1A ¯2, VOL. 98 NO. 1 215 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
then x
* must be positive. Intuitively, if x
* were 
equal to zero, the legislature would be in BAU 
with  probability  one,  so  interest  payments 
must be positive to soak up some of the sur-
plus revenues. On the other hand, if R1r
*2 is 
less than pg
*1A –2, then x
* must be negative. If x
* 
were equal to zero, the legislature would be in 
RPM with probability one so interest earnings 
must be positive to supplement scarce tax rev-
enues. The key determinant of the magnitude 
of x
* is, therefore, the size of the tax base as 
measured by R1r
*2 relative to the economy’s 
desired public good spending as measured by 
pg
*1A2. The greater the relative size of the tax 
base, the larger is the debt level chosen in the 
BAU  regime.  Paradoxically,  therefore,  it  is 
economies with relatively larger tax bases that 
are more likely to be in perpetual debt.
IV.  Political Distortions
A central mission of the contemporary lit-
erature on political economy is to understand 
how political decision making distorts policy   
choices. Propositions 1 and 3 tell us precisely   
how the equilibrium policy sequence differs   
from the planner’s policy sequence. Specifi-
cally, in the long run, the level of debt held by 
the government is too high relative to the opti-
mal level, tax rates are too high, and public 
good levels are too low. Moreover, tax rates 
are too volatile. Since in both the planner’s solution and the equilibrium all citizens receive the 
same expected utility (modulo any differences in initial bond holdings), these distortions mean 
that the political equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the planner’s solution. Thus, the equilib-
rium exhibits political failure in the sense defined by Timothy Besley and Coate (1998).
This inefficiency not withstanding, in the RPM regime, legislators behave exactly as the social 
planner would want them to, given the constraint that future policy choices are politically deter-
mined. This suggests the intriguing idea that the equilibrium policies might solve an appropri-
ately constrained planning problem. The following proposition makes this idea precise.
PROPOSITION 4: The equilibrium value function v1b, A2 solves the functional equation
  v1b, A2 5 max 1r, g, x2eu1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92:
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0, r $ r
*, g # g
*1A2, and x [ 3x
*, x ¯4f,
and the equilibrium policies 5r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A26 are the optimal policy functions for this 
program.
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Comparing the program described in the proposition with that in (8), we see that political 
determination imposes three constraints on the planning problem. First, the tax rate cannot be 
below r
*. Were it to be so, the proposer could benefit his coalition by raising the income tax rate 
and dividing the proceeds among coalition members. Second, the public good level cannot be 
above g
*1A2. If it were, the proposer could benefit his coalition by reducing public good spending 
and dividing the proceeds among coalition members. Third, the debt level cannot be below x
*. 
If it were, the proposer could benefit his coalition by borrowing more and dividing the proceeds 
among coalition members.
The proposition is interesting because it tells us that political determination can be interpreted 
as imposing additional constraints on the planner’s problem, rather than fundamentally changing 
the nature of fiscal policy. The result affirms that the principles of tax smoothing operate even 
when the assumption of a benevolent government is relaxed. Indeed, since the constraints serve 
to break the unpalatable implication of zero taxation in the long run, adding political determi-
nation increases the relevance of the basic tax smoothing idea. The result also helps develop 
intuition on the nature of the political equilibrium: the planner’s problem in the tax smoothing 
context is already reasonably well understood and it is relatively straightforward to think through 
the consequences of the additional constraints.
The proposition makes clear that political economy considerations give rise to distortions in 
taxes and public good spending, as well as in debt. Importantly, the equilibrium policy choices 
are not the same as those obtained from the tax smoothing problem with a constraint that the gov-
ernment’s debt level must exceed x
* (which is the problem studied by Aiyagari et al.). Constraints 
on the tax rate and public good level must also be imposed for the solution to be declared a posi-
tive prediction. The distortions in the tax rate and the public good level are static distortions in 
the sense that, within any period in which the constraints are binding, aggregate citizen welfare 
would be higher if the tax rate were reduced and the public good level increased. The distortion 
in the debt level is a dynamic distortion in the sense that the future benefits to citizens from lower 
debt offset the costs of lower revenues in the present.
There are two basic reasons for the distortions arising from political decision making. First, 
the fact that q is less than n means that the decisive coalition does not fully internalize the costs 
of raising taxes or reducing public good spending. If the legislature operated by unanimity rule 
(i.e., q 5 n), then legislative decision making would reproduce the planner’s solution. This fol-
lows immediately from Proposition 4 once it is noted that with q 5 n, the tax rate r
* is 0, the 
public good level g
*1A2 is just the Samuelson level gS1A2, and the debt level x
* is x _. More gener-
ally, moving from majority to super-majority rule will improve welfare, since raising q reduces 
r
* and x
* and raises g
*1A2, thereby relaxing the constraints on the planning problem.
Second, the random allocation of proposal power in the legislature creates uncertainty about 
the identity of the minimum winning coalition. If the proposer is making transfers to his coali-
tion and anticipates that the legislature will be in BAU the next period, this uncertainty means 
that he will always want to issue more debt. Issuing an additional dollar of debt would gain 1/q 
units for each legislator in the minimum winning coalition and would lead to a one-unit reduc-
tion in pork in the next period. This has an expected cost of only 1/n because members of the 
current minimum winning coalition are not sure they will be included in the next period. The 
critical role of uncertainty can be appreciated by noting that if the identity of the minimum win-
ning coalition were constant through time, the resulting equilibrium policy sequence would be 
Pareto efficient.
17
17 We conjecture that in this “oligarchic” case in which a constant coalition of q representatives chooses policy, the 
economy would converge to a deterministic steady state in which the tax rate is r*, the public good level is g*1A2, and 
the debt level is such that r12x2 1 R1r*2 $ pg*1A ¯2. Excess revenues would be shared by the q representatives.VOL. 98 NO. 1 217 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
V.  Empirical Implications of the Theory
Our theory has two types of empirical implications. First, for a given economy, it has implica-
tions for the pattern of debt, taxes, public spending, and legislative voting behavior.
18 Second, 
comparing across economies, it provides predictions on how the distributions of debt, taxes, and 
public spending should vary with the underlying fundamentals.
For a given economy, the most obvious implication of the theory concerns the impact of an 
increase in the value of public goods as a result of, say, a war or natural disaster. Recall that the 
equilibrium public good level is strictly increasing in A, while the equilibrium tax and debt levels 
are constant in A in the BAU regime and increasing in the RPM regime. Moreover, a sufficiently 
high realization of A must shift the equilibrium from BAU to RPM. Thus, the theory predicts 
that we should observe increases in debt, taxes, and public good spending following a significant 
increase in the value of public goods. This prediction is consistent with the fact that historically 
the debt/GDP ratio in the United States and the United Kingdom tends to have increased in 
periods of high government spending needs and decreased in periods of low needs (Barro 1979, 
1986, 1987). The theory also suggests that we should see a reduction in pork-barrel spending and 
an increase in the size of majorities passing budget bills. While there are issues here concerning 
the empirical measurement of pork, it would be well worth trying to investigate these auxiliary 
predictions.
The theory also has implications for how the equilibrium policies should depend on the current 
stock of debt. Recall that the equilibrium public good level is constant in b in the BAU regime 
and decreasing in the RPM regime, while the equilibrium tax and debt levels are constant in b 
in BAU and increasing in RPM. Moreover, the economy is more likely to be in RPM the higher 
is b. Combining these observations, it is possible to derive some interesting implications for the 
relationship between what is known as the “primary surplus” and the level of debt. The primary 
surplus is the difference between tax revenues and public spending other than interest payments. 
In our model, it is the difference between tax revenues and spending on the public good and 
pork. Using the budget constraint, we may write this as PS1b, A2 5 11 1 r2b 2 x1b, A2. To 
understand what happens to the primary surplus when debt increases, consider a small increase 
Db in b while holding A constant. If the legislature is in BAU, then because x1b, A2 is constant, 
DPS1b, A2/Db 5 11 1 r2. On the other hand, if the legislature is in RPM, then DPS1b, A2/Db 5 
11 1 r2 2 Dx1b, A2/Db, which is positive but less than 1 1 r since x1b, A2 is increasing in b but 
at a rate smaller than 1 1 r.
19 In both cases, therefore, the relationship between the primary 
surplus and debt is positive, but the effect is smaller in the RPM regime. The first implication is 
consistent with the work of Henning Bohn (1998) who finds that for the US federal government 
the relationship between the primary surplus and debt is positive. However, since the economy is 
more likely to be in the RPM regime when b is high, the second implication is inconsistent with 
Bohn’s finding that the relationship is convex. It seems plausible that x1b, A2 might be concave 
in the RPM regime, which would yield Bohn’s finding for sufficiently high levels of debt but, 
unfortunately, this is not something that can be established analytically.
With respect to the impact of the current debt level, the theory also has an interesting implica-
tion for winning margins in the legislature. The expected size of the coalition voting in favor of 
the winning proposal with debt level b is g1A
*1b, x
*22q 1 11 2 g1A
*1b, x
*22n, which is increasing 
18 In light of Proposition 4, these implications are obviously going to be similar to those of a tax smoothing model 
with an ad hoc limit on bond accumulation.
19 This follows from the facts that, in the RPM regime, x1b, A2 1 R1r1b, A22 equals 11 1 r2b 1 pg1b, A2, r1b, A2 is 
increasing in b, and g1b, A2 is decreasing in b.MARch 2008 218 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
in b. Thus, the winning margin on budget bills should be increasing in the current debt level. 
This is a novel prediction which is well worth investigating.
Comparing across economies, the model has three groups of underlying parameters: prefer-
ence parameters, which include the labor supply elasticity e, the discount rate d, and the distribu-
tion of public good values g1A2; technological parameters, which consist of labor productivity 
w and the price of public goods p; and institutional parameters, which consist of the number of 
districts n and the size of the majorities required to pass legislation q. For any given set of param-
eters, the model predicts a unique long-run distribution of debt and associated distributions of tax 
rates, public good spending, and voting coalitions. In principle, therefore, it is possible to explore 
how changes in each of these parameters have an impact on these distributions. For example, 
one could ask how moving from a high- to a low-productivity economy would affect the distribu-
tion of debt. This type of comparative static exercise could be quite valuable, as it would allow 
the development of predictions concerning cross-country (or state) debt distributions, which is 
something the tax smoothing model has trouble explaining (see Alberto Alesina and Roberto 
Perotti 1995; Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey Sachs 1989). Unfortunately, however, it is something 
that appears difficult to do analytically. Thus, it requires computing a calibrated version of the 
equilibrium which, while feasible, would take us well beyond the scope of this paper.
20
Not withstanding the difficulties in characterizing the comparative statics, it is possible to 
make some general informed speculations based on what we know about the underlying logic 
of the model. The key equilibrium variable is x
*—the level of debt that is chosen in the BAU 
regime. As we have explained, x
* adjusts to ensure that in BAU the economy transitions to RPM 
with a probability that is positive but less than one. The equilibrium debt distribution has a mass 
point at x
* and it seems likely that if x
* increases, the debt distribution will shift rightward. We 
have identified the relative size of the tax base as being the key factor in the determination of x
*. 
Thus, parameters that raise R1r
*2 relative to Epg
*1A2 would seem likely to raise the average level 
of debt. This suggests that the average level of debt will be decreasing in e, q/n, and rightward 
shifts in g1A2, and increasing in w.
While we are not aware of empirical evidence on the relationship between debt levels and 
our specific parameters, there is a literature investigating the relationship between fiscal pol-
icy and political variables in the OECD countries.
21 A central theme of this literature is that a 
“fragmented” policymaking process leads to present-biased fiscal outcomes. Influenced by the 
“common pool” view of fiscal policy (see Section VII below for discussion), Roberto Perotti 
and Yianos Kontopoulos (2002) define fragmentation as “the degree to which individual fiscal 
policymakers internalize the costs of one dollar of aggregate expenditure.” Using a number of 
empirical measures of this variable, they have shown that it is positively correlated with higher 
deficits.
22 In our model, as we argued in Section IIIA, fiscal policy is effectively chosen collec-
tively in each period by a coalition of q randomly chosen representatives. Thus, the sole “fiscal 
policymaker” is the group of q representatives, and this group internalizes q/n of the cost of any 
dollar of spending. Accordingly, a prediction that average debt levels are decreasing in q/n would 
appear consonant with this literature.
20 We are currently working on computing the model with coauthor Marina Azzimonti.
21 Our theory is designed to apply to political systems (like that of the United States) in which political parties are 
relatively weak and legislators care a great deal about bringing resources back to their districts. Since the strength 
of parties and the importance of pork-barrel spending in motivating legislators seem to vary significantly across the 
OECD countries, the US states may be the most natural place to look to test the cross-economy implications of the the-
ory. That said, in the spirit of Alesina and Guido Tabellini (1990), it is possible to interpret the n legislators as distinct 
political parties and the pork-barrel spending as transfers to party constituents. The coalition of q legislators choosing 
policy in each period could then be interpreted as that election cycle’s governing coalition.
22 See also Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Bjorn Volkerink and Jakob de Haan (2001) for related findings.VOL. 98 NO. 1 219 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
VI.  An Application of the Theory
To illustrate the potential usefulness of the theory for policy analysis, we briefly explore its 
implications for the desirability of balanced budget requirements. There has been consider-
able debate in academic and policy circles concerning this issue.
23 Many of the US states have 
some form of balanced budget requirement, and there is evidence that they do have an effect.
24 
Proponents argue that they dampen politicians’ ability to borrow and then spend inappropriately. 
Opponents point out that they restrict the state’s ability to adjust to revenue and spending shocks 
without having to raise taxes. Both positions seem reasonable, but to provide sharper policy 
guidance it is necessary to understand the features of the environment that determine when the 
benefits outweigh the potential costs.
25
We consider a fiscal restraint that requires the legislature to ensure that tax revenues equal 
public spending in every period. We assume that in the first period the government begins with 
no debt (i.e., b0 5 0), so that spending is just on public goods and transfers. We seek to under-
stand when citizens’ welfare will be enhanced by the constraint that public spending be financed 
solely by tax revenues.
Let 1rc1A2, gc1A22 denote the equilibrium tax rate and public good level when the value of the 
public good is A under the balanced budget requirement. Then, following the logic of Lemma 1, 
we have that
(25)     
  arg  max eu1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, 0; 02
n
 : B1r, g, 0; 02 $ 0f  if A $ A
*10, 02
       1rc1A2, gc1A22 5 µ     .
  1r
*, g
*1A2)   if A , A
*10, 02
Thus, if A , A
*(0,0), the legislature is in the BAU regime and districts receive pork, while if A 
$ A
*(0,0), the legislature is in the RPM regime. The solution is stationary because government 
cannot issue debt or acquire bonds. If vc1A2 denotes citizen expected utility under the balanced 
budget requirement, given that the current value of the public good is A, then
(26)     vc1A2 5 u1w11 2 rc1A22, gc1A2; A2 1 
B1rc1A2, gc1A2, 0; 02
n
 1 dEvc1A92.
Expected citizen welfare under the constraint is Evc1A2 and equation (26) implies that
(27)     Evc1A2 5 3
A ¯
A –
su1w11 2 rc1A22, gc1A2; A2 1 
B1rc1A2, gc1A2, 0; 02
n
 t dg1A2/11 2 d2.
23 For relevant discussion see Bohn and Robert Inman (1996), Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan (1980), 
William Niskanen (1992), James Poterba (1994, 1995), Poterba and Jurgen von Hagen (1999), and David Primo 
(2007).
24 For example, Poterba (1994) shows that states with restraints were quicker to reduce spending and/or raise taxes 
in response to negative revenue shocks than those without.
25 There appears to be surprisingly little welfare analysis of fiscal restraints beyond the original work of Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980). Besley and Michael Smart (2007) provide a general treatment of restraints in the context of a 
two-period political agency model. Marco Bassetto and Sargent (2006) study the welfare case for separating capital and 
ordinary government budgets and allowing the government to issue debt only to finance capital items.MARch 2008 220 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
As in Section III, let 5r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A26 denote the tax rate, public good, and public 
debt policies that are implemented in the unconstrained equilibrium, and let v1b, A2 denote the 
legislators’ value function. Starting from a situation in which the government has no debt, citizen 
expected utility in the unconstrained equilibrium is Ev10, A2. Thus, a balanced budget require-
ment will be desirable if and only if Evc1A2 . Ev10, A2.
Our first result is that when the revenues raised by the tax rate r
* are never sufficient to cover 
the cost of the optimal level of public goods, a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.
PROPOSITION 5: If R1r
*2 # pg
*1A –2, a balanced budget requirement is not desirable.
To see this, recall from Section III that the condition of the proposition implies that x
* must 
be nonpositive, so that in the BAU regime, the winning proposals involve the purchase of bonds. 
These bond holdings allow the legislature to lower taxes and provide higher levels of public 
goods in the long run. Moreover, the legislature issues debt only in the RPM regime, which 
means that borrowing will be used only when it will raise aggregate utility. Such borrowing must 
therefore be socially beneficial.
An interesting feature of this case is that, under a balanced budget requirement, the legislature 
never engages in pork-barrel spending. (This follows from the fact that the condition implies that 
A
*10, 02 # A –.) By contrast, in the unconstrained equilibrium, the legislature does provide pork 
in the BAU regime. Thus, the balanced budget requirement is undesirable despite eliminating 
transfers. This underscores the lesson that there is nothing necessarily undesirable about trans-
fers—indeed, in the planner’s solution, the government redistributes excess revenues from its 
interest earnings back to the citizens in each period.
Our second result is the mirror image of the first: when the revenues raised by the tax rate r
* 
are always sufficient to cover the cost of the optimal level of public goods when the tax rate is r
*, 
a balanced budget requirement is desirable.
PROPOSITION 6: If R1r
*2 $ pg
*1A ¯ 2, a balanced budget requirement is desirable.
To see this, note that with a balanced budget restraint, the equilibrium will involve the tax 
rate r
* and the public good level g
*1A2 in every period. Without the restraint, the equilibrium will 
involve the legislature immediately borrowing x
* and using the revenues to finance extra pork. 
The amount x
* must be sufficiently large that in future periods there is positive probablity that 
the tax rate will exceed r
* and the public good level will be less than g
*1A2. There is no offsetting 
benefit, and hence eliminating the government’s ability to borrow increases citizen welfare.
If R1r
*2 is between pg
*1A –2 and pg
*1A ¯ 2, but x
* is nonpositive, then the argument underlying 
Proposition 5 remains, and imposing a balanced budget requirement will be harmful. If x
* is 
positive, however, the picture is murkier because there are offsetting effects from imposing the 
requirement. On one hand, the government does not need to service the debt and hence long-run 
taxes and public good levels must be lower on average with the requirement. On the other, the 
government’s ability to smooth tax rates and public good levels by varying the debt level is lost.
Intuitively, it seems natural to suppose that the larger the size of the tax base as measured by 
R1r
*2, the more likely is a balanced budget requirement to be desirable. After all, the larger the 
tax base, the less the need to borrow to meet desired public good spending and the greater the 
debt level that will need to be financed when there is no restraint. This idea can be investigated 
formally by noting that the size of R1r
*2 is determined by the magnitude of the private sector 
wage w. From (4), we see that R1r
*2 equals pg




















we move the size of the tax base through the interval 1pg
*1A –2, pg
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there must exist a critical wage w













1/111e2 such that a balanced budget requirement is desirable if and only w exceeds 
w
*. Unfortunately, however, the argument that this is indeed the case has so far proven elusive.
To summarize: the theory suggests that the key determinant of the desirability of a balanced 
budget requirement is the size of the tax base relative to the economy’s desired public good 
spending. When this size is large, a balanced budget requirement is a good idea, and when it 
is small, the opposite conclusion holds. The relative size of the tax base will be reflected in the 
magnitude of the debt level that is chosen in the BAU regime. Thus, the theory supports the 
common sense conclusion that economies with large and perpetual deficits should introduce bal-
anced budget requirements.
VII.  Related Political Economy Literature
This paper is related to two established branches of the political economy literature.
26 The first 
concerns the implications of pork-barrel spending for the efficiency of legislative policymaking. 
In a well-known paper, Barry Weingast, Kenneth Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen (1981) argue 
that pork-barrel spending will lead to a government that is too large. They do not model the pro-
cess of passing legislation, assuming instead that legislative policymaking is governed by a norm 
of universalism. Under this norm, each legislator unilaterally decides on the level of spending he 
would like on projects in his own district, and the aggregate level of taxation is determined by the 
need to balance the budget. Policymaking then becomes a pure common pool problem.
More recently, the bargaining approach of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) has emerged as the stan-
dard way to model legislative decision making, and a number of papers have employed it to study 
the efficiency implications of pork-barrel spending.
27 In a one period model, Baron (1991) shows 
that legislators may propose projects whose aggregate benefits are less than their costs, when 
these benefits can be targeted to particular districts.
28 This is because the decisive coalition does 
not fully internalize the costs of financing projects. In a similar static framework, Craig Volden 
and Alan Wiseman (2007) study the allocation of a fixed budget between public goods and pork-
barrel spending and show that public goods will be underprovided in some circumstances. In the 
context of a finite horizon dynamic model, William LeBlanc, James Snyder, and Mickey Tripathi 
(2000) argue that legislatures will underinvest in public capital. In their model, in each period 
a legislature allocates a fixed amount of revenue between targeted transfers and a public invest-
ment that serves to increase the amount of revenue available in the next period.
29
The second related branch of political economy literature discusses public debt. This litera-
ture offers two main explanations for why governments may run deficits, even when there is no 
social role for so doing. Following Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), the first explanation 
is based on viewing the accumulation of public debt as a dynamic common pool problem (see, 
26 For excellent reviews of this literature, see Alan Drazen (2000) and Torsten Persson and Tabellini (2000).
27 The main criticism of the common pool perspective is that it does not model the voting process. For game theo-
retic approaches that are alternatives to Baron-Ferejohn, see V. V. Chari and Harold Cole (1995) and Morelli (1999). For 
experimental studies of the Baron and Ferejohn model, see Frechette, Kagel, and Morelli (2005), who study the classic 
static divide-the-dollar version, and Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey (2007), who study a dynamic version.
28 Related models are elaborated by David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks (2005) and Persson and Tabellini 
(2000).
29 As noted in the introduction, our earlier paper (Battaglini and Coate 2007) also explores how pork-barrel spend-
ing distorts investment in public capital goods. Our model differs from that of LeBlanc et al. in that it is an infinite 
horizon model in which the government can levy taxes as well as allocate public revenues, and public investment yields 
benefits for more than one period. We find conditions under which the equilibrium size of government is too large 
and the level of public goods too low; but we also show that there are conditions under which legislative decisions are 
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for example, Robert Inman 1990; Jurgen von Hagen and Ian Harden 1995). A formal model of 
this type is developed by Andres Velasco (2000). While there is no economic role for debt in his 
model, he demonstrates the existence of an equilibrium in which deficits and debt accumulation 
continue unabated until the government’s debt ceiling is reached. Chari and Cole (1993) present 
a related two-period model, where legislators facing a common pool problem that drives spend-
ing too high try to restrain second-period spending by issuing excessive levels of debt in the first 
period.
The second explanation is based on political instability. The basic idea is that when politicians 
choose current policy, they realize that with some probability they will not be choosing policy in 
the future. This may induce too much borrowing because the costs in terms of future spending 
cuts are not fully internalized. This idea was introduced independently by Alesina and Tabellini 
(1990) and Persson and Lars Svensson (1989). Alesina and Tabellini consider a model in which, 
in each period, two political parties hold office with exogenous probability. There are two goods 
that may be publicly provided, but each party’s constituency values only one. The government 
may finance public provision with debt and/or distortionary taxation. In each period, the win-
ning party chooses taxes, debt, and how much to spend on the good its constituency cares about. 
Alesina and Tabellini present conditions under which the steady-state debt level is positive even 
though the optimal debt level is zero. Persson and Svensson consider a two-period model fea-
turing two political parties that differ in their preferences on the level of spending. Spending 
is financed by debt and distortionary taxes. They show that the party that prefers less spend-
ing may run a deficit in the first period to constrain the spending choices of the second-period 
government.
30
While both these arguments require policy-motivated political parties, Alessandro Lizzeri 
(1999) shows that the same logic works even in a world with Downsian parties. He consid-
ers a two-period economy in which elections are held at the beginning of each period. Parties 
can make binding promises before the elections as to how they will redistribute the available 
resources across voters and over time. Rational voters reward myopic behavior, however, favor-
ing a party promising to distribute all resources today, because resources left for the future may 
be spent on others by the opposing party if the first period incumbent is not reelected. Lizzeri 
refers to the force generating the present bias as “redistributive uncertainty.”
It is evident that the arguments underlying the political distortions in our model are similar 
to those made in these two branches of the political economy literature. The static distortions 
in taxes and public goods parallel those that emerge in other legislative bargaining models with 
pork-barrel spending, and the logic of the dynamic distortion is similar to that underlying the 
various models of political instability. As noted in the introduction, what is novel about our 
analysis is that we incorporate these types of forces into a tax smoothing model in which there 
is a social role for debt.
31 Our analysis thus provides insights into how economic and political 
considerations interact to determine the dynamic pattern of fiscal policy. Rather than seeing 
political economy models as alternatives to the tax smoothing model, our work shows how the 
two approaches can be profitably integrated to reduce the shortcomings of each approach indi-
vidually taken.
The objective of incorporating political decision making into a tax smoothing model is also 
shared by the recent work of Pierre Yared (2007). However, he analyzes the complete market 
30 An incumbent government may want to choose debt issue strategically for another reason, namely, to influence its 
likelihood of reelection. This argument is developed by Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1990).
31 Giancarlo Corsetti and Roubini (1997) introduce a motive for tax smoothing into a two-period version of the 
Alesina and Tabellini (1990) model. They show in numerical simulations that the effect of this motive on the first-
period deficit is largely independent of the political incentives to run deficits as measured by the probability that the 
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version of the tax smoothing model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) in which state contingent debt 
is available. He also adopts a more stylized model of the political process than we do, assuming 
that citizens choose the income tax rate, but a self-interested, infinitely lived ruler chooses bor-
rowing and allocates the budget between public goods, his own consumption, and debt repay-
ment. He looks at non–Markov equilibria, in which citizens punish the ruler by levying no taxes 
if he “abuses” his executive power, and the ruler punishes the citizens by underfunding public 
goods if they provide too little revenue. To solve the problem of multiple subgame perfect equi-
libria, he assumes that players can coordinate on equilibria on the Pareto frontier, and the bulk 
of his analysis focuses on the equilibrium that maximizes the citizens’ welfare—the “efficient 
sustainable equilibrium.” In the spirit of our Proposition 4, he shows that it is possible to repre-
sent this equilibrium as the solution of a particular constrained planner’s problem.
32 His main 
finding is that efficient sustainable taxes and debt respond more persistently to shocks than do 
taxes and debt in Lucas and Stokey’s planning problem. Thus, political constraints may explain 
why an economy with complete markets may behave as observed in the empirical literature (and 
predicted by Barro’s incomplete markets tax smoothing model).
VIII.  Conclusion
This paper has presented a dynamic theory of public spending, taxation, and debt. The theory 
brings together ideas from the optimal taxation and political economy literatures. From the for-
mer, the theory adopts the basic framework underlying the tax smoothing approach to fiscal 
policy. From the latter, the theory incorporates pork-barrel spending and employs the legislative 
bargaining approach to modelling policymaking. The result is a tractable dynamic general equi-
librium model that yields a rich set of predictions concerning the dynamics of fiscal policy and 
permits a rigorous analysis of the normative properties of equilibrium policies.
There are numerous ways the theory might usefully be extended. A particularly interesting 
extension would be to introduce cyclical fluctuations in tax revenues due to the business cycle. 
This could be achieved by specifying a stochastic process (with persistence) for the private sector 
wage. Such a model would deliver predictions concerning the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. 
While the tax smoothing paradigm suggests that deficits might be observed in recessions and 
surpluses in booms, observed fiscal policy is often procyclical (Alesina and Tabellini 2005). It 
would be interesting to know what the type of theory developed here predicts.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
From the analysis in the text, we know that if A # A
o1b, x _2, the planner would select a tax rate 
of 0, a public good level of gS1A2, a debt level of x _, and transfer B10, gS1A2, x _; b2 to the citizens. 
Since A
o1x _, x _2 5 A ¯, it follows that once the planner has selected the debt level x _, the economy 
enters a deterministic steady state in which the debt level is x _, the tax rate is 0, the public good 
level is gS1A2, and citizens receive r12x _) 2 pgS1A2 in transfers. Thus, it remains to show only that 
whatever the initial debt level, the planner will eventually select the debt level x _ with probability 
one. We will establish this following the proof of Proposition 4 below.
32 Yared’s work draws on Daron Acemoglu, Mikhail Golosov, and Aleh Tsyvinski (2006a), who characterize effi-
cient sustainable equilibria in a dynamic economy with a self-interested ruler. However, their model is a dynamic 
Mirrlees model rather than a tax smoothing model. Like Yared, they demonstrate that it is possible to represent the effi-
cient sustainable equilibrium as the solution to a planner’s problem with constraints. Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tysvinski 
(2006b) present a similar result for a simpler economic model with a richer political process in which political power 
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DEFINITION OF POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM:
As background for the analysis to follow, we need to provide a more precise definition of 
political equilibrium. An equilibrium is described by a collection of proposal functions: 5rt1b, A2, 
gt1b, A2, xt1b, A2, st1b, A26
T
t51. Here rt1b, A2 is the income tax rate that is proposed at round t when 
the state is 1b, A2; gt1b, A2 is the level of the public good; xt1b, A2 is the new level of public debt; 
and st1b, A2 is a transfer the proposer offers to the districts of q 2 1 randomly selected represen-
tatives.
33 Any remaining surplus revenues are used to finance a transfer for the proposer’s own 
district. Following the notation used in Section III, we will sometimes drop the subscript and 
refer to the first-round policy proposal as 5r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A2, s1b, A26.
The collection of proposal functions 5rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A2, st1b, A26
T
t51 is an equilibrium if, 
at each proposal round t and all states 1b, A2, the prescribed proposal maximizes the proposer’s 
payoff subject to the incentive constraint of getting the required number of affirmative votes and 
the appropriate feasibility constraints. To state this formally, let vt1b, A2 denote the legislators’ 
value function at round t which describes the expected future payoff of a legislator at the begin-
ning of proposal round t in a period in which the state is 1b, A2. Again, following the notation of 
Section III, we refer to the value function at round 1 as v1b, A2. Then, for each proposal round t 
and all states 1b, A2, the proposal (rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A2, st1b, A2) must solve the problem
  max
1r, g, x, s2
u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 B1r, g, x; b2 2 1q 2 12s 1 dEv1x, A92
  s.t. u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 s 1 dEv1x, A92 $ vt111b, A2,
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 1q 2 12s, s $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4.
The first constraint is the incentive constraint and the remainder are feasibility constraints. The 
formulation reflects the assumption that, on the equilibrium path, the proposal made in the first 
proposal round is accepted.
As noted in the text, the legislators’ round one value function is defined recursively by (17). To 
understand this, recall that a legislator is chosen to propose in round one with probability 1/n. If 
chosen to propose, he obtains a payoff in that period of
  u1w11 2 r1b, A22, g1b, A2; A2 1 B1r1b, A2, g1b, A2, x1b, A2; b2 2 1q 2 12s1b, A2.
If he is not chosen to propose, but is included in the minimum winning coalition, he obtains 
u1w11 2 r1b, A22, g1b, A2; A2 1 s1b, A2, and, if he is not included, he obtains just u1w11 2 
r1b, A22, g1b, A2; A2. The probability that he will be included in the minimum winning coalition, 
conditional on not being chosen to propose, is 1q 2 12/1n 2 12. Taking expectations, the pork-
barrel transfers s1b, A2 cancel and the period payoff is as described in (17).
Once we have the round one value function, the other value functions can be readily derived. 
For all proposal rounds t 5 1,  …  , T 2 1, the expected future payoff of a legislator if the round t 
proposal is rejected is
  vt111b, A2 5 u1w11 2 rt111b, A22, gt111b, A2; A2 1 
B1rt111b, A2, gt111b, A2, xt111b, A2; b2
n
 
  1 dEv1xt111b, A2,A92.
33 It should be clear that there is no loss of generality in assuming that the proposer offers transfers only to q 2 1 
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This reflects the assumption that the round t 1 1 proposal will be accepted. Recall that if the 
round T proposal is rejected, the assumption is that a legislator is appointed to choose a default 
tax rate, public goods level, level of debt, and a uniform transfer. Thus,
vT111b, A2 5 max
1r, g, x2
  uu1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92: B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4v.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
We begin by establishing the claim made in the text that, given that utility is transferable, the 
proposer is effectively making decisions to maximize the collective utility of q legislators under 
the assumption that they get to divide any surplus revenues among their districts.
LEMMA A1: Let 5rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A2, st1b, A26
T
t51 be an equilibrium with associated value 
function v1b, A2. Then, for all states 1b, A2, the tax rate–public good–public debt triple Art1b, A2, 
gt1b, A2, xt1b, A2B proposed in any round t solves the problem
  max
1r, g, x2
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
q
 1 dEv1x, A92    s.t. B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4.
Moreover, the transfer to coalition members is given by
  st1b, A2 5 vt111b, A2 2 u1w11 2 rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2; A2 2 dEv1xt1b, A2, A92.
PROOF:
See Web Appendix.
Using this result, we can prove:
LEMMA A2: Let 5rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A2, st1b, A26
T
t51 be an equilibrium with associated value 
function v1b, A2. Then, there exists some debt level x




  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92
  1rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A22 5 arg  maxµ	 ∂,
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4
and st1b, A2 5 0, while if A , A
*1b, x
*2











  if t 5 1,  …  , T 2 1
  st1b, A2 5 µ  .
  vT111b, A2 2 u1w11 2 r
*  2, g
*1A2; A2 2 dEv1x
*, A92  if t 5 TMARch 2008 226 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
PROOF:
The argument in Section III of the paper, together with Lemma A1, implies that, for any pro-
posal round t if A $ A
*1b, x
*2,
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92
  1rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A22 5 arg  max  µ	 ∂,
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4
while if A , A
*1b, x
*2,




Turning to the equilibrium transfers, it is clear that, since there are no surplus revenues when A 
$ A
*1b, x
*2, transfers are zero. If A , A
*1b, x
*2, it follows that for all proposal rounds t 5 1,  …  , T 
2 1, we have that
  vt111b, A2 5 u1w11 2 r
*, g












*; b2/n  t 5 1,  …  , T 2 1
  st1b, A2 5 µ  .
  vT111b, A2 2 u1w11 2 r
*, g
*1A2; A2 2 dEv1x
*, A92    t 5 T
This completes the proof of Lemma A2.
Lemma 1 now follows immediately from Lemma A2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
We begin by proving the existence of an equilibrium. The proof is divided into seven steps.
Step 1: Let F denote the set of all real valued functions v1· , ·2 defined over the compact set 3x _, x ¯4 
3 3A –, A ¯4. Let F
* be the subset of these functions that are continuous and concave in x for all A. 
For any z [ 31R1r
*2 2 pg
*1A ¯22/r, x ¯4 and v [ F
*, consider the maximization problem
  max 1r, g, x2  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92
  s.t. B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0, r $ r
*, g # g
*1A2 and x [ 3z, x ¯4.
For all m . 0, let
  x
m
z1v2 5 arg  max
x
  e 
x
m
 1 dEv1x, A92: x [ 3z, x ¯4f,
and let x
m
z1v2 be the largest element of the compact set x
m
z1v2. Notice that x
m
z1v2 is nonincreasing 
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Suppose that 1r, g, x2 is a solution to the maximization problem. It is straightforward to show 
that (i) if A # A
*1b, x
n
z1v22 then 1r, g2 5 1r
*, g
*1A22 and x [ x
n
z1v2 > 5x : B1r
*, g
*1A2, x; b2 $ 06; (ii) 














z1v22, 1r, g, x2 is uniquely defined and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover, r . r
* 
and g , g
*1A2. Note that in all cases the tax rate and public good level are uniquely defined.
Step 2: For any z [ 31R1r
*2 2 pg
*1A ¯22/r, x ¯4, define the operator Tz : F
* S F as follows:
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92
  Tz1v21b, A2 5 max
1r, g, x2
  µ		 ∂.
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0, r $ r
*, g # g
*1A2 and x [ 3z, x ¯4
It can be verified that Tz1v2 [ F
* and that Tz is a contraction. Thus, there exists a unique fixed 
point vz1b, A2 which is continuous and concave in b for all A. This fixed point satisfies the func-
tional equation
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEvz1x, A92
  vz1b, A2 5 max
1r, g, x2
  µ		 ∂.
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0, r $ r
*, g # g
*1A2 and x [ 3z, x ¯4




z1vz22 then 1r, g2 5 1r
*, g
*1A22 and x [ x
n
z1vz2 > 5x : B1r
*, g















z1vz22, 1r, g, x2 is uniquely defined and the budget constraint is binding. Moreover, r . r
* 
and g , g
*1A2. Again, in all cases the tax rate and public good level are uniquely defined. Let 
these be given by 1rz1b, A2, gz1b, A22—these are also continuous functions on the state space.
Step 3: For any z [ 31R1r
*2 2 pg
*1A ¯22/r, x ¯4, the expected value function Evz1· , A2 is strictly con-
cave on the set 5b [ 3x _, x ¯4 : A
*1b, x
q
z1vz22 , A ¯}.
PROOF:
See the Web Appendix.
Step 4: For any z [ 31R1r
*2 2 pg




  M1z2 5 arg  max  e
x
q
 1 dEvz1x, A2 : x [ c              , x ¯d f.
  r
Then there exists z
* [ 31R1r
*2 2 pg




See the Web Appendix.
Step 5: Let z









z*1vz*2 is the largest element in the set x
q
z*1vz*2. By construction, z






*2 5 arg  max  e
x
q
 1 dEvz*1x, A2 : x [ c              , x ¯d f.
  r
Since z
* obviously satisfies the constraint that x $ z














           1 dEvz*1x
q


















* $               ,
  r
which implies that pg
*1A ¯2 1 rx
q
z*1vz*2 . R1r





z*1vz*22 , A ¯. By con-









z*1vz*22 , A ¯. But by Step 3, the expected value function Evz*1· , A2 is strictly con-




* be such that z
* [ M1z
*2. Then, the function vz*1· , A2 is differentiable for all b such 


























See the Web Appendix.
Step 7: Let z
* be such that z
* [ M1z
*2. Then, the following constitutes an equilibrium. For each 
proposal round t,
  1rt1b, A2, gt1b, A2, xt1b, A22 5 1rz*1b, A2, gz*1b, A2, xz*1b, A22;
for proposal rounds t 5 1,  …  , T 2 1,
  st1b, A2 5 B1rz*1b, A2, gz*1b, A2, xz*1b, A2; b2/n;
and for proposal round T,
  sT1b, A2 5 vT111b, A2 2 u1w11 2 rz*1b, A22, gz*1b, A2; A2 2 dEvz*1xz*1b, A2, A92,VOL. 98 NO. 1 229 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
where
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEvz*1x, A92
  vT111b, A2 5 max
1r, g, x2
  µ	 ∂.
  s.t. B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4
PROOF:
Given these proposals, the legislators’ round one value function is given by vz*1b, A2. This fol-
lows from the fact that






  1 dEvz*1xz*1b, A2, A92 5 vz*1b, A2.
Similarly, the round t 5 2,  …  , T legislators’ value function vt1b, A2 is given by vz*1b, A2. It follows 
from Steps 3 and 6 that the value function vz*1b, A2 has the properties required for an equilibrium 
to be well behaved. Thus, we need only show: (i) that, for proposal rounds t 5 1,  …  , T 2 1, the 
proposal









1r, g, x, s2
u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 B1r, g, x; b2 2 1q 2 12s 1 dEvz*1x, A92
  s.t. u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 s 1 dEvz*1x, A92 $ vz*1b, A2,
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 1q 2 12s,  s $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4,
and (ii) that, for proposal round T, the proposal
  1rz*1b, A2, gz*1b, A2, xz*1b, A2, vT111b, A2 2 u1w11 2 rz*1b, A22, gz*1b, A2; A2 2 dEvz*1xz*1b, A2, A922
solves the problem
  max
1r, g, x, s2
u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 B1r, g, x; b2 2 1q 2 12s 1 dEvz*1x, A92
  s.t. u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 s 1 dEvz*1x; A92 $ vT111b, A2,
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 1q 2 12s,  s $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4.
We show only (i)—the argument for (ii) being analogous.
Consider some proposal round t 5 1,  …  , T 2 1. Let 1b, A2 be given. To simplify notation, let
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It is clear from Step 5 and the argument in the text that 1r ˆ, g ˆ, x ˆ2 solves the problem
  max
1r, g, x2
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
q
 1 dEvz*1x, A92
  s.t. B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0 and x [ 3x _, x ¯4,
and that s ˆ 5 vz*1b, A2 2 u1w11 2 r ˆ2, g ˆ; A2 2 dEvz*1x ˆ, A92. Suppose that 1r ˆ, g ˆ, x ˆ, s ˆ2 does not solve 
the round t proposer’s problem. Then, there exist some 1r9, g9, x9, s92 which achieves a higher 
value of the proposer’s objective function. We know that s9 $ vz*1b, A2 2 u1w11 2 r92, g9; A2 2 
dEvz*1x9, A92. Thus, we have that the value of the proposer’s objective function satisfies
  u1w11 2 r92, g9; A2 1 B1r9, g9, x9; b2 2 1q 2 12s9 1 dEvz*1x9, A92
  # q3u1w11 2 r92, g9; A2 1 dEvz*1x9, A924 1 B1r9, g9, x9; b2.
Since B1r9, g9, x9; b2 $ 0, we know that
  q3u1w11 2 r92, g9; A2 1 dEvz*1x9, A924 1 B1r9, g9, x9; b2 
  # q3u1w11 2 r ˆ2, g ˆ; A2 1 dEvz*1x ˆ, A924 1 B1r ˆ, g ˆ, x ˆ; b2.
But the right-hand side of the inequality is the value of the proposer’s objective function under 
the proposal 1r ˆ, g ˆ, x ˆ, s ˆ2. This, therefore, contradicts the assumption that 1r9, g9, x9, s92 achieves a 
higher value for the proposer’s problem.













t51 be two equilibria with associated round one value func-
tions v
01b, A2 and v




1 be the debt levels chosen in the BAU regimes of the two 













1 results in a contradiction.
As in the proof of existence, define the operator Tz : F
* S F as follows:
  u1w11 2 r2, g; A2 1 
B1r, g, x; b2
n
 1 dEv1x, A92
  Tz1v21b, A2 5 max
1r, g, x2
 µ  ∂.
  B1r, g, x; b2 $ 0, g # g
*1A2, r $ r
* and x [ 3z, x ¯4
We know that Tz1v2 [ F





Now, let v [ F
* be such that for all b, v1 · , A2 is differentiable at b for almost all A, and for each 
i [ 50, 16 consider the sequence of functions 8vk
i9
`







i2. Notice that since Txi is a contraction, 8vk
i9
`
k51 converges to v
i. We now establish 
the following result:
CLAIM: Let r9 [ 10, r2. Then, for all k and for any x [ 3x1
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PROOF:
The result is established via induction and the details can be found in the Web Appendix.
To complete the uniqueness proof, observe that for i [ 50, 16 the function E1v
i1  · , A22 is con-
cave and differentiable. In addition, 8E1vk
i1  · , A229 is a sequence of concave and differentiable 
functions such that for all x  limkS`E1vk
i1x, A22 5 E1v
i1x, A22. Thus, by Theorem 25.7 of R. Tyrrell 
Rockafellar (1970), we know that limkS`dE1vk
i1x, A22/dx 5 dE1v
i1x, A22/dx. It follows that, for 























































































But this implies that x1
* 2 1x1
* 2 x0
*2/11 1 r92 # x0
*, which contradicts the fact that x1
* . x0
*.
It follows that x0
* 5 x1
*. This, in turn, implies that v
0 5 v














PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Given the discussion in the text, the only thing we need to show is that the equilibrium debt 
distribution converges to a unique invariant distribution. Let ct1x2 denote the distribution func-
tion of the current level of debt at the beginning of period t. The distribution function c11x2 is 
exogenous and is determined by the economy’s initial level of debt b0. To describe the distribu-
tion of debt in periods t $ 2, we must first describe the transition function implied by the equi-
librium. First, define the function A ˆ : 3x _, x ¯4 3 1x
*, x ¯4 S 3A –, A ¯4 as follows:
  A –  if x , x1b, A –2
  A ˆ1b, x2 5 µ min 5A [ 3A –, A ¯4 : x1b, A2 5 x6 if x [ 3x1b, A –2, x1b, A ¯24 .
  A ¯  if x . x1b, A ¯2MARch 2008 232 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
Intuitively, A ˆ1b, x2 is the smallest value of public goods under which the equilibrium debt level 
would be x, given an initial level of debt b. Then, the transition function is given by
  g1A ˆ1b, x22   if x [ 1x
*, x ¯4
  h1b, x2 5 •  .
  g1A
*1b, x
*22  if x 5 x
*
Intuitively, h1b, x2 is the probability that in the next period the initial level of debt will be less 
than or equal to x [ 3x
*, x ¯4 if the current level of debt is b. Using this notation, the distribution of 
debt at the beginning of any period t $ 2 is defined inductively by
  ct1x2 5 3
b
h1b, x2 dct211b2.
The sequence of distributions 8ct1x29 converges to the distribution c1x2 if for all x [ 3x
*, x ¯4, 
we have that limtS`ct1x2 5 c1x2.
34 Moreover, c






We can now establish that the sequence of debt distributions 8ct1x29 converges to a unique invari-
ant distribution c
*1x2.
It is easy to prove that the transition function h1b, x2 has the Feller Property and that it is 
monotonic in b (see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989, chap.12.4) for definitions). By Theorem 
12.12 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), therefore, the result follows if the following “mixing 
condition” is satisfied:
MIxING CONDITION: There exists an e . 0 and m $ 1, such that h
m1x ¯, x
*2 $ e and 1 2 
h
m1x _, x
*2 $ e, where the function h
m1b, x2 is defined inductively by h
11b, x2 5 h1b, x2 and 
h
m1b, x2 5 ezh1z, x2 dh
m211b, z2.
Intuitively, this condition requires that if we start out with the highest level of debt x ¯, we will 
end up at x
* with probability greater than e after m periods, while if we start out with the low-
est level of debt x _, we will end up above x
* with probability greater than e in m periods. For any 
b [ 3x _, x ¯4 and A [ 3A –,A ¯4, define the sequence 8fm1b, A29 as follows: f01b, A2 5 b, fm111b, A2 5 
x1fm1b, A2, A2. Thus, fm1b, A2 is the level of debt if the debt level were b at time 0 and the shock 
were A in periods 1 through m. Recall that, by assumption, there exists some positive constant j 
. 0, such that for any pair of realizations satisfying A , A9, the difference g1A92 2 g1A2 is at least 
as big as j1A9 2 A2. This implies that for any b [ 3x _, x ¯4, h
m1b, fm1b, A – 1 l22 2 h
m1b, fm1b, A –22 
$ j
ml
m for all l such that 0 , l , A ¯ 2 A –. Using this observation, we can prove:
CLAIM 1: For m sufficiently large, h
m1x ¯, x
*2 . 0.
34 In the present environment, this definition is equivalent to the requirement that the sequence of probability mea-
sures associated with 8ct1x29 converges weakly to the probability measure associated with c1x2 (see Stokey, Lucas, and 
Edward Prescott 1989, Theorem 12.8).VOL. 98 NO. 1 233 BATTAgLINI ANd cOATE: PuBLIc SPENdINg, TAxATION, ANd dEBT
PROOF:
It suffices to show that for m sufficiently large A
*1fm1x ¯, A –2, x
*2 . A –. Then, for any such m, by 
continuity, there is a lm small enough such that A
*1fm1x ¯, A – 1 lm2, x


























  $ g1A
*1fm1x ¯, A – 1 lm2, x
*223h
m211x ¯, fm211x ¯, A – 1 lm22 2 h
m211x ¯, fm211x ¯, A –224
  $ g1A
*1fm1x ¯, A – 1 lm2, x
*221jlm2
m21 . 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that for all m we have that A
*1fm1x ¯, A –2, x
*2 # A –. Then, it must be the 
case that the sequence 8fm1x ¯, A –29 is decreasing. To see this, note that since r1b, A2 is increasing 
in A, we have that
  1 2 r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A –2  1 2 r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A2
  , 3
A –
A ¯
q  r dg1A2.
  1 2 r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A –211 1 e2  1 2 r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A211 1 e2
But the first-order condition for x1b, A2 (i.e., (11) with the appropriate value function) and the 
derivative of the value function (23) imply that
  1 2 r1fk211x ¯, A –2, A –2  1 2 r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A2
(A.1)  5 3
A –
A ¯
q  r dg1A2.
  1 2 r1fk211x ¯, A –2, A –211 1 e2  1 2 r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A211 1 e2
Since r1b, A –2 is increasing in b and A, this implies fk211x ¯, A –2 . fk(x ¯, A –2.
We can therefore assume, without loss of generality, that fm1x ¯, A –2 converges to some finite b $ 
x _. We now prove that this yields a contradiction. Taking the limit as m S `, continuity of r1  · , A –2 
would imply limkS`r1fk1x ¯, A –2, A2 5 r1f`1x ¯, A –2, A2 for all A. Using condition (A.1):
  1 2 r1f`1x ¯, A –2, A –2  1 2 r1f`1x ¯, A –2, A2
  5 3
A –
A ¯
q  r dg1A2,
  1 2 r1f`1x ¯, A –2, A –211 1 e2  1 2 r1f`1x ¯, A –2, A211 1 e2
which is impossible since r1f`1x ¯, A –2, A2 is strictly increasing in A. We conclude, therefore, that 
for m sufficiently large, A
*1fm1x ¯, A –2, x
*2 . A –, which yields the result.
Next, we can establish:















*22, the level of debt chosen in period 1 is x
* when the initial level of 






m22, the level of debt is x
* for the first m 2 1 MARch 2008 234 ThE AMERIcAN EcONOMIc REVIEW
periods. Given this, the probability that the level of debt is larger than x











These two claims imply that the Mixing Condition is satisfied if q , n. To see this, choose m 
sufficiently large so that h
m1x ¯, x
*2 . 0. This is always possible by Claim 1. Now, let






















*2 . A –. Thus, e . 0 and the condition is satisfied.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
This result follows from Step 7 of the existence part of the proof of Proposition 2.
COMPLETION OF PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
As discussed in the text, Proposition 4 implies that legislative decision making delivers the 
planner’s solution when q 5 n. Thus, we need only show that when q 5 n, the equilibrium debt 
level will reach x _ with probability one. Since x
* 5 x _ when q 5 n, Claim 1 of Proposition 3 implies 
that there exists a e . 0 and a m such that for any initial b, the probability that x 5 x _ in the next 
m periods is at least e. Thus, the probability that x is never equal to x _ in the next j · m periods is 
not larger than 11 2 e2
j. Since limjS`11 2 e2
j 5 0, we conclude that the probability that x is 
never equal to x _ is zero.
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